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National institutional systems as antecedents of female board 
representation: An empirical study 
ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Empirical  
Research Question/Issue: How are national institutional systems related to the proportion of 
women found on corporate boards of directors of companies listed in particular countries? 
Which particular types of national institutions play the most important role? We explore 
cross-country variation in the pattern of female representation on corporate boards and 
evaluate the extent to which it is associated with the nature of national institutional systems 
as captured in five frameworks each of which emphasises the importance of a distinct type of 
national institutions. Our analysis includes 38 countries and covers the years 2001-2007 
Research Findings/Insights: Our findings show that as much as half of the variation in the 
presence of women on corporate boards across countries is attributable to national 
institutional systems and that culturally and legally-oriented institutional systems appear to 
play the most significant role in shaping board diversity. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our study suggests that country-level institutions, 
previously neglected in studies of board diversity, play an important role in shaping the 
prevalence of women on corporate boards and that these need to be more fully incorporated 
in future research on board diversity. 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: The importance of national institutional systems for board 
diversity suggests that policy levers of a regulatory nature and national cultural characteristics 
are important elements in driving corporate board diversity and offer distinct opportunities 
for tailoring a mix of corporate governance interventions that suit the particular institutional 
nature of a given country.  
Key words:  Corporate Governance, Corporate Board diversity, Board Demography, 
Institutional Theory 
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 2 
National institutional systems as antecedents of female board 
representation: An empirical study 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The role played by national business environments for a range of corporate 
behaviours has long been of interest to Corporate Governance scholarship (Jackson & Deeg, 
2008; Parboteeah, Hoegl & Cullen, 2008). National institutional factors have been identified 
as shaping a wide variety of business behaviours including entry strategies (Brouthers, 2002), 
diversification (Lee, Peng & Lee, 2008), innovation (Lundvall, Johnson, Anderson & Dalum, 
2002), and corporate governance practices (Denis & McConnell, 2003). Although 
comparative, cross-national, research has addressed a wide range of phenomena, it has not, 
with some notable exceptions (e.g. Leksell & Lindgren, 1982; Terjesen & Singh, 2008), 
contributed significantly to research on corporate boards of directors. While a substantial and 
growing body of research has focused on corporate governance systems and their 
development internationally (Aguilera, 2005; Denis & McConnell, 2003; Khanna, Kogan & 
Palepu, 2006), such research has tended to focus on systemic issues such as evaluating the 
extent of convergence/divergence in practice internationally, rather than on questions 
concerned with boards of directors or their composition (Aguilera, 2005; Denis & 
McConnell, 2003; Fligstein & Freeland, 1995).  
In recognition of their strategic importance, research concerned with boards of 
directors has proliferated in recent years. Within this, a considerable stream of research 
concerning the demographic aspects of boards of directors has emerged with a particular 
emphasis on the gender balance of boards of directors (Hillman, Cannella & Harris, 2002; 
Hillman, Shropshire & Cannella, 2007; Singh, 2007; Terjesen, Sealy & Singh, 2009). In this 
article, we explore cross-country variation in the pattern of female representation on 
corporate boards and examine the potential for it to be associated with national institutional 
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 3 
systems as captured in five distinct frameworks. Research on the institutional features of 
countries has shown that particular institutional characteristics, such as the nature of welfare, 
education and financial systems, and legal, regulatory, and political processes, tend to exhibit 
complementarities such that countries typically exhibit a set, or “bundle”, of mutually 
reinforcing institutional characteristics (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Moreover, research has 
suggested that groups of countries exist that each share a distinctive bundle of institutional 
features (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Together, these distinctive bundles of institutional 
features and those countries that are associated with them constitute “institutional systems” 
and prior research has identified a variety of these systems that stem from the particular 
disciplinary orientation of the institutional analysis. For example, economically-oriented 
institutional analysis has identified distinct varieties of capitalism (Hall  & Soskice, 2001) 
and national business systems (Whitley, 1992; 1999), while political/legal institutional 
research has identified distinct legal systems (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 
1998) and systems of corporate governance (Weimer & Pape, 1999), and sociological 
research has identified systems of national culture (Gupta, Hanges & Dorfman, 2002).  Our 
analysis examines both the overall predictive power of particular institutional systems in 
respect of the variation across countries in the prevalence of women on corporate boards, and 
whether support is provided for hypothesised differences between the clusters of countries 
within each national institutional system and the proportion of women on corporate boards.  
Through this analysis, we make two significant contributions. First, we extend and 
complement earlier analyses of the factors associated with greater prevalence of women on 
corporate boards of directors to encompass macro-level influences and processes. Given the 
presence of a significant debate concerning the mix of policies and practices necessary to 
promote women’s participation on corporate boards, our analysis is able to shed light on the 
relevance of national institutional systems to this debate. Second, we apply the analysis of the 
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 4 
influences of national institutional systems to encompass the domain of board demography. 
In so doing, we contribute to the development of the emerging literature that addresses a 
comparative analysis of country institutions for business behaviours and outcomes and 
contribute to the project of “gendering” comparative institutional analysis (Estevez-Abe, 
2005, 2006; Mandel & Shalev, 2009).  
The next section reviews existing literature relating to women on corporate boards 
(WOCBs). We then outline alternative conceptions of national institutional systems and 
develop hypotheses regarding how these influence the prevalence of WOCBs. We then 
discuss our empirical methods and report our findings.  Subsequently, we discuss the 
importance of these, for both the literatures on board demography and comparative 
institutional analysis. A final section concludes.  
 
PRIOR RESEARCH ON WOCBs 
A large body of research has focused on WOCBs. In the most recent comprehensive 
review of this research, Terjesen et al. (2009) identify over 400 published references on the 
topic, including 180 articles in academic journals and books. Terjesen et al. (2009) classify 
extant research according to its level of analysis: micro (relating to individual directors), 
meso (relating to boards or firms/organisations), and macro (relating to the industry/wider 
environment within which boards and organisations are situated). Within this, the vast 
majority of existing scholarship focuses on analysis at the micro or meso levels, with 
relatively little research addressing macro-level issues.  
At the micro level, a large amount of research has analysed the characteristics of 
WOCBs and has attempted to explore their experiences of involvement in boards of directors 
(Talmud & Izraeli, 1999; Terjesen et al., 2009). Much of this research has identified the 
formal educational attainment and experiential characteristics that women need to obtain 
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 5 
board positions. Burke (1997), Sheridan (2002) and Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) surveyed 
female board directors in Canada, Australia and the UK respectively and higher education 
attainment in the form of university degrees were prevalent amongst the female directors in 
all three countries as well as extensive business experience. In a similar vein, Bilimoria and 
Piderit (1994) conclude that even though women possess sufficient educational qualifications 
and relevant professional experience “…they continue to be blocked in their rise to the top” 
(Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994: 1471) suggesting that even if women attain the formal and 
professional prerequisites for board directorships, they face a number of organisational 
barriers en route to board directorships, including opaque recruitment processes, insufficient 
career development opportunities and lower remuneration (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004). 
Sheridan (2002) in her research on Australian female board directors’ experiences concluded 
that as well as relevant and professional experience, the women’s contact network was crucial 
in securing their board positions.  
At the meso level, a considerable amount of research has described the prevalence of 
WOCBs, often by undertaking a “census” of the boards of companies listed on local stock 
exchanges, and sought to understand these by reference to organisational characteristics 
(Terjesen et al., 2009). Many studies have examined  the prevalence of WOCBs within 
particular country settings including the UK (Conyon & Mallin, 1997; Sealy, Singh 
&Vinnicombe, 2007; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004, 2006; Singh, Vinnicombe & Johnson, 
2001), the US (Adams and Flynn, 2005; Arfken, Bellar & Helms, 2004; Farrell & Hersch, 
2005; Peterson & Philpot, 2007; Soares, Carter & Combopiano, 2009), Canada (Burke, 1997, 
1999), Switzerland (Ruigrok, Peck & Tacheva, 2007), Australia (Kang, Cheng & Gray, 2007; 
Ross-Smith & Bridge, 2008; Sheridan, 2002), New Zealand (McGregor, 2003), Denmark 
(Rose, 2007), Israel (Talmud & Izraeli, 1999), and Spain (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008; 
De Anca, 2008). Looking across the available evidence suggests that there is a striking degree 
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 6 
of variation in the proportion of board directors who are women in a given country, ranging 
from less than one percent in Switzerland (Ruigrok et al., 2007) to just over 15% in the US 
(Soares et al., 2009), suggesting that a given number of companies could have more than 100 
times more female directors in the United States than in Switzerland. 
A second important strand of meso-level research has examined the organisation-level 
antecedents of WOCBs. Singh and Vinnicombe (2004), mirroring earlier findings in the US, 
UK and Canada, show that even among the largest 100 UK companies, the very largest 
companies are twice as likely to have a female director as the smaller companies, suggesting 
that firm size plays a significant role in influencing board diversity. There is also strong 
evidence that where women and minorities are present on corporate boards they are far more 
likely to be found in non-executive (outside) positions and may be less likely to be 
represented on key board committees (Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994; Conyon & Mallin, 1997; 
Daily, Certo & Dalton, 1999), indicating that the structure of corporate boards, and 
particularly the balance between executive and non-executive directors, influences board 
diversity. Other correlates of board diversity have attracted less clear support from earlier 
evidence. For example, Singh and Vinnicombe (2004), in contrast to the findings of Burke 
(1999), find no significant pattern in the link between board size and the presence of a female 
director. 
At the macro-level, research has been more limited, but has examined the importance 
of a firm’s industry environment for the prevalence of WOCBs and, more recently, upon 
some of the cross-country influences on WOCBs. A number of studies have highlighted the 
importance of a firm’s business activity or industry in shaping the presence of women at 
board level (Hillman et al., 2007; Singh et al., 2001; Burke, 1999; Nelson & Levesque, 2007). 
Pfeffer (1973) shows that the institutional environment significantly influenced the 
composition of hospital boards, and Hillman, Cannella & Paetzolds’(2000) study of the 
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 7 
composition of boards in the US airline industry showed that as the institutional regulatory 
environment changed, so too did the composition of the board “…to reflect the shift in 
resource needs confronting the firm” (Hillman et al., 2000: 252). Similarly, Burke (1999) 
demonstrates that there are significant differences across industries in the pattern of board 
diversity with conglomerates having significantly more diverse boards than oil/gas and 
mining/minerals companies. 
Regarding country-level antecedents of WOCBs, a small number of studies have 
begun to explore issues relating to the importance of institutional factors for the presence of 
WOCBs. Public policy environments have attracted particular attention, especially in light of 
the commitments of some governments to greater female representation on corporate boards 
(De Anca, 2008; Hoel, 2008). In a related vein, Esping-Andersen (1990) evaluates the role of 
institutional welfare provisions in promoting female work force participation across western 
economies. He notes the distinctive role the state has played in Scandinavian countries, in 
particular in Sweden and Norway, where maternity leave has ensured that women are able to 
actively pursue professional career and skills development outside the home. This is an 
essential first step for women wishing to acquire the necessary skills and competencies 
required to pursue executive ambitions. More recently, Terjesen and Singh (2008) evaluated 
women’s share of the corporate board seats in an international perspective and detailed the 
prevalence of women corporate board directors across a broad range of countries finding that 
a greater presence of WOCBs was found in countries with greater prevalence of women in 
senior official and management positions. 
To summarize, extant research has identified a wide range of explanations regarding 
why such a small proportion of company directorships are occupied by women in many 
countries. Most research has argued that women are discriminated against in the appointment 
processes for board positions, or that women may lack the necessary competencies, networks 
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 8 
or desire to pursue board appointments. More recently, research has begun to address more 
structural barriers to greater female participation on corporate boards, which operate in 
particular industry or country environments. However, as yet, very little systematic research 
has been undertaken that sheds light on the particular nature of these structural impediments 
to higher proportions of women on corporate boards and it is to this deficit that we address 
our analysis. 
 
COUNTRY INSTITUTIONS AND WOCBs 
In this section, we develop the argument that national institutional systems play a 
substantial role in shaping the demography, particularly in respect of gender, of the board of 
directors of companies active in particular countries. Research in an international 
comparative institutional tradition has proliferated in recent years and has drawn together 
contributions from the political sciences, economics, sociology, and management studies 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001; La Porta et al., 1998; Whitley, 1999). In recognition of the “bundled”, 
or inter-dependent, nature of many institutional phenomena, the development of national 
institutional systems in the form of typologies, taxonomies and classifications of countries 
with shared institutional characteristics has been central to extant scholarship (La Porta et al., 
1998; Weimer and Pape, 1999; Whitley, 1999). In this study, we draw upon five of the most 
widely cited systems of national institutions and examine both the strength of the association 
between these frameworks and the cross-national pattern of WOCBs and hypothesised 
relationships between clusters of countries within each framework and the prevalence of 
WOCBs. The five national institutional systems we draw upon differ principally in respect of 
the emphasis placed upon specific types of institutions. For example, economic institutions 
are emphasised in both Hall and Soskice’s (2001) Varieties of Capitalism approach and 
Whitley’s (1992, 1999) National Business Systems theory, legal/regulatory institutions are 
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 9 
central to La Porta et al.’s (1998) and Weimer and Pape’s (1999) institutional systems, and 
systems of national culture are core to Gupta et al.’s (2002) country clusters.  In the 
remainder of this section, we provide a brief overview of each system of national institutions 
and develop testable hypotheses regarding the differences between clusters of countries 
within each system that we expect to play an important role in shaping the prevalence of 
WOCBs. 
 
National Economic Systems 
 
Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) & WOCBs. Hall and Soskice (2001) are concerned 
with economic institutions and conceptualise a framework of institutional comparison based 
on an actor centred approach, which se s developed economies divided into two principal 
categories depending on their national pattern of institutions: the coordinated market 
economy (CME), and the liberal market economy (LME). They argue that firms as actors 
must engage with a variety of institutions in their pursuit of corporate strategy and 
profitability, including labour relations, industry collaboration and coordination and 
education. The degree to which economic institutions are subjected to market coordination 
(LMEs) versus non-market coordination (CMEs) and, by extension, how these two distinct 
forms of economic systems create institutional complementarities within a given country 
impacts on the country’s competitive positioning (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Hall and Soskice 
(2001) highlight Germany, Switzerland and Belgium as examples of coordinated market 
economies (CME). These countries are hallmarked by strong labour relations, extensive 
vocational training programmes and strong business networks. The US, the UK and Australia 
on the other hand, are seen as the archetypical liberal market economies (LME) where the 
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market plays a determining role in balancing industrial relations, commerce is largely 
contractually based and extensive industry collaborations are replaced by competition.  
Recently, a strand of scholarship has begun the project of “gendering the VOC” 
approach by exploring the implications of economic systems and their institutional 
characteristics for gender inequality (Estevez-Abe, 2005, 2006; Mandel & Shalev, 2009; 
Soskice, 2005). Of particular importance within this research are the characteristics of labour 
market institutions, and specifically those that influence the patterns of skill investments 
made by individuals (Estevez-Abe, 2005, 2006; Mandel and Shalev, 2009). Estevez-Abe 
(2005, 2006) argues that the institutional characteristics of CMEs are not conducive to female 
managerial ambitions because of the character of their “skill regimes”. In CMEs, skill 
regimes are characterised by “institutions that make long-term mutual commitments between 
employers and workers credible….much stronger employment protection legislation and 
more generous unemployment benefits which make specific skill investments more viable, 
[and] close cooperation between unions and employers [that] sustain a robust vocational 
training in secondary schools” (Estevez-Abe, 2005:189). In contrast, in LMEs skill regimes 
lack many of those strong institutions and are, thus, more strongly oriented to the 
development of general skills, including most “certified general education—including high 
school diploma, BA, MBA, and a license to practice medicine or law” (Estevez-Abe, 
2005:190). The implication of this view at the aggregate, country, level is that, perhaps 
paradoxically given their strong record on other aspects of gender equality (such as those 
reflected in benefits systems), CMEs are less likely to develop women with the skills 
necessary to compete for board positions because “the emphasis in coordinated economies on 
specific skills is more appropriate to the male model of full-time continuous employment, 
these economies are likely to exclude women from many sectors of employment” (Mandel & 
Shalev, 2009:165). Moreover, women’s predicament is further exacerbated by maternity 
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leave, and other social, policies. Whilst maternity policies are designed to safeguard women’s 
jobs during child rearing and offer women the chance to continue work once the child is of a 
certain age, employers incur significant costs in covering for maternity absences such as 
hiring temporary staff. This reinforces the diminished return on investment to the firm, which 
again results in firms preferring to hire and invest in male employees, thereby perpetuating 
rather than addressing the disadvantageous position women may find themselves in.  
 
H1:  There is a larger share of women on the corporate board of directors in liberal market 
economies than in coordinated market economies. 
 
National Business Systems & WOCBs. The National Business Systems perspective 
(NBS henceforth) (Whitley, 1992, 1999) emphasises the economic aspects of institutions and, 
like Hall and Soskice’s (2001) varieties of capitalism (VOC), proposes that clusters of 
countries exist that share a number of common economic institutional characteristics. The 
common focus on economic institutions means that the VOC and NBS perspectives share a 
number of features (Jackson & Deeg, 2006, 2008). At the same time, the NBS framework 
proposes a greater number of clusters of countries that is based upon a focus on a greater 
range of national institutions than that encompassed in the VOC approach and, in particular, 
with a greater emphasis on diversity in the systems of ownership control and sectoral and 
inter-sectoral coordination between companies (Jackson and Deeg, 2006). Hence, while the 
VOC approach classifies Ireland and the UK as LMEs, in contrast to typical CMEs such as 
Germany and Norway, because of their similar configuration of financial, skills and welfare 
systems, the NBS approach sees Ireland as a collaborative system, along with Norway and 
Germany, in light of similarities in the ownership of companies and in the patterns of sectoral 
and inter-sectoral coordination. While the differences between the VOC and NBS approaches 
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are to a substantial extent differences of degree, rather than differences of a fundamental 
nature, given the prevalence of both frameworks in corporate governance research (Aguilera 
& Jackson, 2003; Hall & Gingerich, 2009; Jackson & Deeg, 2006; Pedersen & Thomsen, 
1999) we felt it important to assess whether the subtle distinctions inherent in the two 
frameworks were significant in the context of corporate board demography. Whitley (1992, 
1999) identifies six distinct national business systems, reflecting the degree to which various 
elements of national economic systems are represented in particular countries: Fragmented, 
Coordinated Industrial District, Compartmentalised, State Organised, Collaborative and 
Highly Coordinated national business systems. Central to our discussion is the identification 
and differentiation between distinct approaches to talent and leadership development, 
employment and career progression and the impact these differences have on top 
management recruitment. The collaborative business system relies on cooperative working 
relationships between owners of the firm, providers of capital and other business partners, 
such as industry associations and chambers of commerce. These industry alliances and 
interest organisations are in the main male dominated and do therefore not represent a 
relevant way in which women may derive the contacts and networks necessary for executive 
leadership positions (Welter, 2006) . The systems which centre on coordination, such as the 
coordinated industrial district and the highly coordinated economy seek to "establish long 
term connections with their core workforce and develop distinctive patterns of skill and job 
organisation" (Whitley, 1992:16). The general employment characteristics associated with 
these countries are a long term commitment to the firm/employer on part of the employee, 
segmentation of employees between a core and a peripheral work force, with the peripheral 
workforce often consisting predominantly of women, an emphasis on firm specific skills and 
the institutionalisation of organisational careers (Whitley, 1992; Houseman and Abraham, 
1993). These factors result in promotions based on seniority within companies and a top 
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management team with a high degree of firm specific skills (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; 
Whitley, 1992). Such a system is likely to disadvantage women who are less likely to invest 
in firm specific skills given that their employment trajectory is more likely to encompass 
career breaks to raise children and the investment in firm specific skills takes longer to 
recuperate and offers less flexibility in career advancement terms (Shire & Gottschall, 2007).  
Career progression in compartmentalised countries, by comparison, relies on market 
forces, lower levels of firm specific skills, considerable movement between firms and 
industries. Countries classified as compartmentalised are, according to Whitley (1992) more 
likely to recruit executive management from outside the firm and to place more emphasis on 
university degrees and generic skills with an associated merit rather than seniority-based 
remuneration and promotion structure. As women are more likely to invest in generic skills 
and develop transferable managerial competencies which is compatible with a family life 
(Shire & Gottschall, 2007; Webb, 2009) women are more likely to acquire senior executive 
positions in compartmentalised economies. In state-organised business systems the founding 
families and their allies are often able to retain considerable control as the state typically 
provides subsidised credit to these firms (Whitley, 1992). Johannisson and Huse (2000) found 
that where familial relations were central to firm management, women were more likely to 
take on executive management roles. We therefore propose that: 
 
H2: There is a larger share of women on corporate boards of directors in countries 
classified as Compartmentalised, and State-Organised than in countries classified as 
Collaborative, Fragmented, Coordinated Industrial Districts or Highly Coordinated 
economies.  
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National Legal Systems 
 
Legal Origin & WOCBs. Having discussed the possible relevance of national 
economic systems for the prevalence of WOCBs, we now turn to the likely impacts of legal 
and regulatory national systems that have been central to political science research on country 
institutions. La Porta et al. (1998) ground their framework of national institutions within 
country legal heritages. Constructing a data set of 27 countries, the authors determine legal 
heritage for each country based on established legal distinctions developed by Reynolds and 
Flores (1989). Reynolds and Flores (1989) consider differences across countries with regards 
to national judicial heritage, with particular foci on the distinction between common law and 
civil law. The legal families identified are: English, German, French and Scandinavian-
origin. Countries classified as having a legal structure based on the English common law are 
put in the English-Origin Countries, whilst countries based on the civil law heritage are 
allocated to the French, German and Scandinavian-origin clusters, depending on the 
particular institutional features of the country.  Regulative institutions at the national level 
have been found to play a role in the managerial employment opportunities women are 
afforded (Parboteeah et al., 2008). Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2004) investigated the role played by labour regulation across 85 countries, including the 
role regulative heritage played in encouraging female labour force participation. The authors 
concluded that where extensive employment protection laws were in place women’s work 
force participation rates were higher compared to men, and the authors observed that “In 
broad terms, common and civil law traditions utilize different strategies for dealing with 
market failure: the former relying on contract and private litigation and the latter on direct 
supervision of markets by government. Under this theory, the historical origin of a country's 
law shapes its regulation of labour and other markets" (Botero et al., 2004:1340). Civil law 
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countries traditionally have more extensive employment protection laws and better legislation 
covering social and welfare policies that are designed to safeguard and promote women’s 
pursuit of professional careers outside the home (Botero et al., 2004). In Common Law 
countries, market forces are more dominant; employment contracts tend to be more flexible 
and welfare legislation concerned with engendering a work-life balance that allows women to 
pursue professional careers and have family commitments is less extensive (Botero et al., 
2004). In contrast to the argument put forth in support of hypothesis one, the argument we 
extend here suggests that civil law countries, many of whom are also CMEs, tend to have a 
higher rate of female labour force participation which enables women to build the necessary 
professional experience and professional ties which affords them the opportunity to ascend 
the corporate ladder (ibid). This argument is justified on the basis that the legal framework 
we evaluate here is focused on legislative heritage rather than broader institutional facets, and 
ceteris paribus, civil-law legislation is designed to be beneficial to women. Therefore we 
suggest that: 
 
H3:  There is a smaller share of women on the corporate board of directors in countries 
classified as English-Origin legal systems than in countries with French, German and 
Scandinavian-origin legal systems. 
 
Corporate Governance & WOCBs. Patterns of corporate board demography have 
been shown to be substantially influenced by the prevailing national corporate governance 
practices (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Ruigrok et al., 2007). Weimer and Pape (1999) 
synthesise a framework that revolves around eight corporate governance characteristics as 
follows: the prevailing concept of the firm; the board system; the stakeholders that have the 
ability to influence managerial decision making; the equity market’s importance in the 
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national economy; the prevalence for a market for corporate control, corporate ownership 
concentration, the strength of a link between managerial performance and pay and time scale 
involved in economic relationships. Weimer and Pape (1999) argue that distinct geographic 
regions will exhibit similar bundles of these eight features, and they identify four clusters of 
national corporate governance, a Japanese, a Germanic, a Latin and Anglo-Saxon system of 
corporate governance. The literature that investigates the salience of corporate governance 
practices for corporate board demography, shows that that where more concentrated forms of 
share ownership prevail, companies tend to have more female corporate board directors 
(Ruigrok et al., 2007). Concentrated share ownership is a central feature of the Germanic and 
Latin systems of corporate gov rnance.  From a stakeholder perspective, where family 
connections and patriarchal ownership structures dominate, women are more frequently 
accorded board directorships (Branson, 2007; Johannisson & Huse, 2000; Sheridan & 
Milgate, 2005). Broad stakeholder engagement and concentrated forms of ownership are 
hallmarks of the Latin origin and the Germanic origin corporate governance framework 
(Weimer & Pape, 1999). The notable exception to these research findings is Japan. Japan is 
known for highly concentrated ownership (Yafeh, 2000). Historically, Japanese boards are 
heavily insider dominated. Board directors are in the main drawn from a select group of 
highly committed managers forming part of the core workforce where women are broadly 
absent, as women are in the main assigned to the peripheral workforce (Aguilera, 2005; 
Houseman & Abraham, 1993; Miyajima, 2009; Whitley, 1992) 
Broader stakeholder engagement and better governance are also arguments used in 
favour of the dual tiered board structure which is common in Germanic origin countries and 
permissible in Latin origin countries (Huse, Nielsen & Hagen, 2009; Levinson, 2001; 
Weimer & Pape, 1999). Employee representatives are likely to be more diverse, and in 
particular women have often been found to be more prevalent among employee board 
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directorships. Although an employee wields different powers to the executive and non-
executive directors, they are considered full board members (Cotton, Vollrath, Froggatt, 
Lengnick-Hall & Jennings, 1988). We therefore suggest: 
 
H4: There is a larger share of women corporate board directors in countries classified as 
Germanic and Latin than in countries classified as Japanese or Anglo-Saxon. 
 
National Cultural Systems 
  Cultural clusters & WOCBs. Research has established that national culture is an 
important factor defining wom n’s role in society more broadly, but also that country cultures 
help shape corporate board demography (Adams & Flynn, 2005; Burke & Mattis, 2000; 
Hofstede, 1983). Research concerned with national culture has established that such cultures 
are multifaceted with Hofstede’s pioneering research identifying five dimensions to national 
culture and the more recent, and more comprehensive, Global Leadership and Organizational 
Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE) project identifying nine dimensions of national culture, 
some of which map closely onto Hofstede’s original dimensions. While both Hofstede’s work 
and the GLOBE project are concerned with exploring the dimensionality of national culture, 
they stop short of providing a typology of countries that have similar patterns of cultural 
institutions. Gupta et al. (2002) analyse national cultures using data from the GLOBE project 
and construct a framework which shows that national cultures, though consisting of a set of 
distinct dimensions, also share significant similarities across particular geographic regions. 
Gupta et al. (2002) show that clusters of countries have common cultural characteristics, and 
in total they identify 10 such geographic cultural clusters. Of particular interest to our study is 
the degree to which culturally held attitudes to gender may impact on women’s executive 
career opportunities and ambitions. In particular, following Parboteeah et al. (2008) we focus 
Page 17 of 47
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 18 
on how different patterns within four of the nine aspects of national culture identified in the 
GLOBE research (gender differentiation, assertiveness, uncertainty avoidance and power 
distance) that are present in particular groups of countries play a role in shaping corporate 
board demography. Gender differentiation is the degree to which men and women are viewed 
differently in a given society. Where gender differentiation is lower, women are more likely 
to assume senior positions of authority (Javidan & House, 2001). The Nordic European and 
Eastern European cultural clusters have lower levels of gender differentiation (Bakacsi, 
Takács, Karácsonyi & Imrek, 2002; Szabo, Brodbeck, Den Hartog, Reber, Weibler & 
Wurder, 2002), whilst the Anglo cultural cluster score higher (Ashkanasy, Trevor-Roberts & 
Earnshaw, 2002), as do the Latin and Asian cultural clusters (Gupta et al., 2002). The 
assertiveness category in the GLOBE framework is not dissimilar to the Masculinity element 
articulated by Hofstede (1983). Assertiveness refers to elements of aggression and 
confrontation in social relationships. Assertive societies are deemed to be characterised by 
more masculine values and norms with an emphasis on toughness and material possessions 
(Parboteeah et al., 2008), suggesting societal attitudes linked to more traditional gender 
stereotype roles. The Germanic cultural cluster scores high on assertiveness (Szabo et al., 
2002). Uncertainty avoidance refers to a nation’s reliance on well established social norms to 
cope with unpredictability. Bilimoria and Piderit (1994) stated that companies were 
occasionally reluctant to take on women directors as there was perceived risk and uncertainty 
in appointing them, hence countries that score high on uncertainty avoidance are expected to 
have fewer female board directors. The Eastern European cultural cluster is particularly 
associated with low uncertainty avoidance (Bakacsi et al., 2002). Finally, the concept of 
power distance captures the degree to which a country accepts and recognises that power is 
unequally distributed in society. Hierarchies, patriarchal control and gender inequalities are 
often associated with countries that are considered to have high power distance. Women are 
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often accorded positions at the bottom of the career ladder and are expected to adhere to more 
traditional female gender roles (Parboteeah et al., 2008), suggesting women are less likely to 
hold positions of power in such societies. The Germanic and Latin European cultural clusters 
are associated with high levels of power distance.  
 
H5:  There is a smaller share of women on the corporate board of directors in countries 
classified as Anglo, Germanic, Latin European, Latin American, Sub-Saharan, 
Confucian Asian and Southern Asian cultures than in countries classified as Nordic 
European or Eastern European cultures. 
 
METHODS 
Sample 
Our analysis focuses on exploring the extent to which variation between countries in 
the prevalence of women on corporate boards of directors can be explained by corresponding 
variations in their institutional environments. It follows from these objectives that our 
analysis requires that there are corporations, i.e. companies that adopt the corporate form, and 
that these companies have boards or a comparable highest corporate decision making body. 
Notwithstanding these constraints, our sample encompasses all the major continents 
including Europe (including almost all of Western Europe, many countries of the former 
Eastern Bloc, and Southern Europe including Greece and Turkey), Australasia, Africa, Asia 
(including key economies such as Japan, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, India and Malaysia), 
Latin America (including Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Chile), and the United States and 
Canada. Notwithstanding this, the constraints described above did limit the number of 
countries included from Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia. In total 38 countries were 
included in our analysis, and the sample covers the years 2001-2007. 
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 Dependent Variable 
Following earlier WOCB research, our dependent variable is the percentage of 
women on corporate boards in a given country/year and is calculated according to methods 
similar to those followed by Arfken et al. (2004) and Terjesen and Singh (2008) in that we 
draw upon a range of primary and secondary sources and focus on the largest listed 
companies in a given country. Given our approach of examining the composition of the 
boards of the largest listed companies for as many companies for which reliable estimates 
could be identified, a primary issue relates to the variation in stock market depth across 
countries and, hence in the number of firm-level observations available upon which to base 
an estimate of the overall prevalence of WOCBs in a given country. For example, while there 
are thousands of listed companies in the United States, and hundreds in many European 
countries, many countries have fewer (<30) large listed companies. Our approach to dealing 
with this issue was fourfold. First, we sought to use as much information as possible in 
deriving our estimates of the proportion of WOCBs – i.e. to use the full range of listed 
companies for countries where that was available. Second, we imposed a lower bound of 10 
on the number of companies per country that we required to provide an estimate for that 
country in order to eliminate possibly spurious estimates based on very small numbers of 
companies. Third, we attempted wherever possible to triangulate our estimate with estimates 
available in a range of secondary sources described below. Fourth, we undertook a range of 
robustness tests that imposed different thresholds for the number of company observations 
used in the analysis to ensure that our findings were robust to this decision. 
For many countries we aggregated from the firm to the country level using board data 
from company annual reports as compiled by BoardEx, a commercially available database of 
the largest listed companies in a wide range of countries, which has been used in earlier 
academic research (Singh, 2007). For other countries, we collected data directly from 
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corporate annual reports. For example, using Latin Trade’s list of Top 500 companies in 
Latin America by Net Sales, we identified companies for Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico, the largest Latin American trading economies. Given the difference in the size and 
scale of the Latin American trading economies this meant that for some countries we 
included all the companies on the Latin Trade 500 list e.g. Argentina, whilst for other 
countries like Mexico, we included the 65 companies that had a corporate board based in 
Mexico, however we did not include large companies that were incorporated in Mexico but 
which were under the auspice of the parent company board which was based overseas. In 
addition to this firm level data, we used data from a variety of other sources including the 
European Commission, Spencer Stuart Board Indices, Catalyst, the Australian Equal 
Opportunities for Women in the Workplace Agency (EOWA), Business Women’s 
Association South Africa and Globe Women.  Where this process provided us with multiple 
estimates of the prevalence of women on boards within a particular country, we elected to 
adopt the estimate that was generated using the largest sample of firm observations since we 
viewed this as providing the most robust and reliable estimate. From these sources we 
identified how many board seats each corporation had and how many of these seats were 
occupied by women. We then aggregated this to the national level by calculating how many 
board seats the largest publicly listed companies had between them in total, and then we 
calculated how many of these seats were held by women. We then divided the total number 
of board positions held by women by the total number of board seats available and arrived at 
a percentage share of board seats held by women for a given country. 
 
Independent variables 
Our approach involves generating a set of independent variables that encapsulate the 
distribution of countries across each of the five national institutional systems discussed 
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above. This was done on the basis of an extensive review of the literature concerned with 
comparative institutional analysis. For four of the five systems of national institutions we 
draw upon, the authors attribute countries to clusters in such a way as to make construction of 
our independent variables straightforward (Gupta et al., 2002; Hall & Soskice, 2001; La Porta 
et al., 1998; Weimer & Pape, 1999). Only in the case of NBS was additional research 
required in order to attribute particular countries to the classifications described in the 
conceptualisation of country institutional systems. Where possible, we supplemented this 
with an examination of key indicator variables highlighted in the frameworks that we drew 
from databases constructed by the OECD and World Bank. Drawing upon multiple sources 
enables us to triangulate our attribution of particular countries to categories described in the 
NBS approach and so give us greater confidence in the robustness of this process of 
attribution. Table 1, below, describes the attribution of countries to particular clusters within 
each national institutional system. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Having attributed as far as possible countries to clusters within the national 
institutional systems, we constructed a family of dummy variables for each system that 
encapsulated the grouping of countries within particular clusters. For example, in the case of 
Hall and Soskice’s (2001) economic framework varieties of capitalism, we created three 
variables labelled “Liberal Market Economy”, “Coordinated Market Economy”, and “Other 
Economies”. Each variable takes a value of one if a given country is attributed to that cluster, 
and zero otherwise. In a similar manner, we created a family of dummy variables that capture 
the clusters of national economic systems encompassed in the NBS approach (Whitley, 
1999), the national legal systems identified in La Porta et al. (1998), the clusters of national 
Page 22 of 47
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 23 
systems of corporate governance proposed in Weimer and Pape (1999) and the cultural 
clusters identified in Gupta et al. (2002). In each case, we also created an additional variable 
“Other” to which any country not included in the authors’ data set was ascribed. In the case 
of the cultural clusters, identified in Gupta et al. (2002), the Arab culture was excluded from 
our analysis due to the lack of sufficient data for Arab countries.  
 
Control variables 
In order to reflect the possibility that the composition of boards of directors has changed over 
time independent of the nature of the prevailing national institutional systems, we created a 
set of dummy variables, one for each year encompassed by our dataset, which take a value of 
one if a given observation is attributable to that year, and zero otherwise. 
 
FINDINGS 
In this section, we discuss the findings of our empirical analysis. We begin by 
providing a descriptive overview of the prevalence of women on corporate boards. This 
descriptive overview is presented in table 2, below. Consistent with the observations of 
earlier research, the prevalence of women on corporate boards (as reflected in the percentage 
of directorships held by female directors) varies very substantially across countries (Burke, 
1999; Burke & Mattis, 2000; Conyon & Mallin, 1997; Singh et al., 2001, 2004; Terjesen & 
Singh, 2008). At one end of the spectrum, 30% or more of directorships are occupied by 
female directors in Norway, Bulgaria, Finland and Latvia, while, at the other, female 
directors are almost entirely absent from boardrooms in Japan, Singapore, Egypt and Chile. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
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Before reporting our regression results, we present the descriptive statistics, and 
correlation coefficients for our data. Given the mutual exclusivity of the classification of 
countries to particular clusters within each national institutional system, our analysis is very 
unlikely to encounter multicolinearity. As expected given this mutual exclusivity, there are 
negative correlations between the clusters within a given system of national institutions.  
Perhaps most interesting is the pattern of correlation between particular clusters of different 
national institutional systems. Very high positive correlations were found between 
membership of the Liberal Market Economy cluster, the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance 
cluster and the Anglo cultural cluster. A similarly high correlation was found between 
involvement in the coordinated market economy and in the Germanic system of governance 
cluster. Since Japan is the only country in these categories, correlations of 1 were found 
between Confucian Asian cultures, the Japanese system of governance and the highly 
coordinated economy cluster. Other high correlations were seen where they would be 
expected such as the correlation between Germanic cultural cluster and the Germanic law 
cluster, and between the Anglo-Saxon cultural cluster and the Anglo-Saxon legal system 
cluster. Given the variety present in the fundamental precepts of these alternative conceptions 
of national institutions, the pattern of correlations identified is strongly suggestive of 
significant interdependencies between elements of national institutional systems. However, in 
other areas, the correlations are quite low, indicating that there is also a significant degree of 
heterogeneity across different conceptions of the prevailing national institutional systems.  
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Turning to our regression analysis, our initial results are reported in table 4. In order 
to avoid the dummy variable trap, it is necessary to omit one cluster from each of our national 
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institutional systems (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998). The “Other economies” 
cluster was omitted from the Varieties of Capitalism framework, in order to retain both the 
LME and CME clusters. In the analysis of systems of legal/regulatory, corporate governance 
and cultural institutions, we omitted the Germanic cluster as this was closest to the mean for 
the dependent variable. The compartmentalised cluster was omitted from the NBS model as 
this included the US and the UK the two largest developed trading economies in the sample, 
where the largest share of board seats available to women would be found. In considering our 
results, the interest lies principally in two aspects. First, the explanatory power of each model 
provides an insight into the overall importance of a particular national institutional system for 
the prevalence of women on a country’s boards. Given that the number of clusters identified 
within the each institutional framework varies, the focus is appropriately with the adjusted R-
squared statistic. Second, the statistical significance of particular clusters of countries within 
each framework provides an insight into the particular institutional characteristics that are 
conducive, or otherwise, to greater female representation on corporate boards.  
We report two sets of regression results that differ according to the sample analysed. 
The first set of results, models 1-6 reported in table 4, outline the findings of explaining the 
variance across countries and time in the prevalence of women on corporate boards where the 
sample is the maximum permitted given the breadth of our database and the range of 
countries identified in the conceptual discussions of national institutional systems (described 
in table 1). Model 1 provides a baseline by exploring the relationship between the prevalence 
of women on corporate boards and time alone. Overall, this model explains approximately 
13% of the variance between countries and time in the level of female representation on 
corporate boards. Furthermore, and consistent with recent evidence, our results show that the 
proportion of directorships held by female directors has grown quite substantially in recent 
years. Specifically, we estimate that the percentage of women on boards has grown by nearly 
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6% in the period 2000-2007. Relative to the average initial level of board diversity in our 
sample of approximately 6%, this is a substantial change. Models 2-6 examine the 
explanatory power and pattern of significance of each of the five systems of national 
institutions discussed above in turn. Respectively, models 2-6 explore the relevance for 
female board representation of economic institutions (models 2 and 5), legal/regulatory 
institutions (models 3 and 4) and cultural institutions (model 6).  
Model two explores the relevance for WOCBs of national economic systems as 
reflected in the VOC approach (Hall & Soskice, 2001), and the model finds that the share of 
female corporate board directors is higher in both coordinated market economies (Model 2: 
t=1.05, p<0.01) and in liberal market economies (Model 2: t=1.10, p<0.01) than in other 
economies, but that there is no statistically significant difference between LMEs and CMEs 
in respect of the prevalence of WOCBs. The adjusted R² for this model is 15.9%, suggesting 
that national economic institutions, thus conceptualised, add about 8% to the overall 
explanatory power of the base model. Model 3 examines the importance of national legal 
institutions for WOCBs. The analysis shows that countries with legal frameworks that are 
characterised as being English Origin (Model 3: t=0.80, p<0.01) and Scandinavian Origin 
(Model 3: t=0.93, p<0.01) have a significantly greater percentage of WOCBs than countries 
with either French or Germanic legal heritages. Regarding the addition to the overall 
explanatory power of the base model provided by including national legal systems, we find 
that the adjusted R² for model 3 is 51.9%, a very substantial increase relative to the base 
model, suggesting that national legal institutions are, overall, very important for WOCBs. 
Model 4 evaluates the role of corporate governance systems in shaping the extent of WOCBs. 
Countries classified to the Latin (Model 4: t=0.96, p<0.01) and Japanese (Model 4: t=3.14, 
p<0.05) corporate governance systems were found to have a significantly lower percentage of 
women on their boards compared with both the Anglo-Saxon and German systems of 
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corporate governance. Regarding the overall contribution of national systems of corporate 
governance to the explanatory power of the model, model 4’s adjusted R-Squared is 32.5%, 
suggesting that systems of corporate governance play a modest role in shaping WOCBs.  
Model 5 evaluates the significance of national economic systems as seen in the NBS 
framework and reveals that countries in both the Co-ordinated Industrial Districts (Model 5: 
t=1.24, p<0.01) and Highly Co-ordinated (Model 5: t=3.12, p<0.05) clusters have 
significantly lower proportions of women on their boards than countries classified to the 
other clusters.  Finally, model 6 explores the relevance of national cultural institutions for 
WOCBs. The coefficients for the Anglo cluster (Model 6: t=0.79, p<0.01) of countries along 
with the Nordic European (Model 6: t=0.96, p<0.01), Eastern European (Model 6: t=0.96, 
p<0.01) and Sub-Saharan (Model 6: t=1.34, p<0.01) were positive and statistically significant 
suggesting that these clusters have significantly greater percentages of women on their boards 
than the Germanic European cluster of countries. The South Asian, Latin Europe and 
Confucian Asian clusters had a lower proportion of WOCBs than the Germanic European 
cluster, however only the Confucian Asia result was marginally significant at the 10% level. 
The overall contribution of introducing cultural clusters to the base model led to an increase 
in the adjusted R-Squared to 47.4%, suggesting that cultural institutions are also a very 
important influences on WOCBs. Comparing the additions to the explanatory power, models 
2-6 range from an R-squared of 21% to 54%. The largest increments to explanatory power 
were related to the inclusion of national legal systems and national cultures, suggesting that 
the relatively legally and culturally-oriented institutional systems have more to offer in 
explaining board diversity than the economically-oriented national institutional systems or 
systems of corporate governance.   
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------------------------------------------ 
Insert table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Reflecting the variation in the breadth of countries encompassed by the national 
institutional systems, the number of observations varies very significantly across the models 
presented in table 4. Consequently, both the relative predictive ability of the frameworks and 
the substantive conclusions concerning the clusters of countries most associated with higher 
proportions of WOCBs may simply be an artefact of the variation in the sample across the 
models. Therefore, in order to test the findings reported above for robustness, we undertook a 
second phase of analysis that focused on a common sample of countries/years that were 
available for all of the national institutional systems. These results are presented in models 7-
11 in table 5. Given the need for commonality across all five frameworks, this reduces the 
number of observations considerably and reduces the range of categories of some institutional 
systems present in our analysis. Specifically, focusing on the set of countries which are 
present in each institutional system eliminates the Eastern European, Latin American, South 
Asian, and Sub-Saharan cultural clusters from our analysis.  
Substantively, the results are very similar to those discussed above. For example, 
concerning the explanatory power of the models, the overall contributions made by adding 
national cultural clusters and national legal systems remain higher than the additional 
explanatory power obtained by adding national economic institutions or systems of corporate 
governance. Hence, we find further evidence that among the breadth of national institutional 
systems, cultural and legal systems play the most significant role in shaping the prevalence of 
women on boards. Concerning the particular clusters of countries captured in the specific 
national institutional systems, the findings regarding models 7-11 are strongly resonant with 
those discussed above. Specifically, Scandinavian and English legal systems, Anglo-Saxon 
and Germanic systems of corporate governance, and Nordic European and Anglo-Saxon 
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cultures are most conducive to high levels of female representation on corporate boards. In 
contrast, women are substantially less prevalent on corporate boards in Latin and Japanese 
governance systems, and in Latin and Confucian cultures.  
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
The final robustness test to be completed concerned ensuring the inclusion of Norway 
had not unduly skewed the results, given the legislative requirement for female corporate 
board representation in Norway. Consequently, the regressions presented in Model 1-6 were 
re-run absent the Norwegian data. The results conformed to those presented in table 4 and are 
therefore not reported here. This test confirmed that the inclusion of Norway in the analysis 
did not impact our analysis. Regarding the findings with respect to particular institutional 
configurations, Scandinavian legal systems, Anglo-Saxon and Germanic modes of corporate 
governance, and Nordic cultures are found to be most conducive to the presence of higher 
percentages of women on corporate boards.  
Reflecting upon the results presented in tables 4 and 5 in light of our hypotheses 
suggests that we find some support for many of the hypothesised relationships. Specifically, 
we find some support for hypothesis 1 in that, controlling for variation across models in 
sample size, liberal market economies have a ratio of women on corporate boards 
approximately two percentage points greater than that seen in coordinated market economies. 
The evidence also supports hypothesis 2 to a substantial degree with highly coordinated and 
coordinated industrial district economies exhibiting significantly fewer women on their 
boards than other types of economy. In respect of hypothesis 3, results are mixed. While, 
consistent with hypothesis 3, we find that countries with Scandinavian legal systems to have 
significantly higher percentages of women on their boards, we, in contrast to hypothesis 3, 
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find that countries with English-origin legal systems have a higher prevalence of WOCBs 
than countries with French and German origin legal systems. Results in respect of hypothesis 
4 are also mixed with support for a higher proportion of WOCBs in countries with Germanic 
systems of corporate governance relative to other systems and a significantly lower rate of 
WOCBs among countries with Japanese corporate governance. At the same time, countries 
with Latin systems of corporate governance had a lower percentage of WOCBs than those 
with Anglo-Saxon corporate governance, contrary to hypothesis 4. Finally, hypothesis 5 
attracted strong support with greater proportions of WOCBs being found in Nordic and 
Eastern-European cultural clusters than elsewhere. 
 
DISCUSSION 
In this study, we have examined the role played by national institutional systems in 
explaining cross-country variation in the prevalence of WOCBs. In order to address this 
question, we have compared the predictive power and substantive implications of five 
existing frameworks of national institutional systems that emphasise the importance of 
economic, legal/regulatory, corporate governance and cultural institutions. These frameworks 
encapsulate a variety of national institutional characteristics and provide a means to 
distinguish between the salience of different aspects of country institutional systems in 
shaping board demography. Our findings show that as much as half of the variation across 
countries in the presence of women on corporate boards is attributable to institutional factors 
and that, overall, legal and cultural institutions appear to play the most significant role in 
shaping the prevalence of women on corporate boards. Our analysis makes an important 
contribution to the Corporate Governance literature, which has called for further analysis of 
how country level institutional systems influence and explain a variety of interest-group level 
phenomenon (Redding, 2005), and to research concerned with WOCBs, where it has been 
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observed that “the field would benefit from further international studies” (Terjesen et al., 
2009: 333). This study is among the first to systematically assess the explanatory power of 
institutional influences on WOCBs and, through this, we significantly extend the literature on 
board demography. Our analysis complements existing research on WOCBs by showing that 
not only do processes that shape board demography work at the firm and industry level, but 
there are also a set of processes related to a country’s institutional environment that play an 
important role in shaping the prevalence of women on boards and that contribute significant 
structural barriers to, or facilitators of, the presence of WOCBs. This suggests that research 
concerning board demography should now pay greater attention to macro-level influences 
and the relationship between these and meso- and micro-level influences associated with 
industry pressures, firm characteristics and internal firm processes of director selection and 
retention.  
Beyond exploring the broad macro-level relevance of national institutional systems 
for WOCBs, our analysis of the variation within each system, and between clusters of 
countries with similar underlying institutional characteristics, also found support for a 
number of hypothesised relationships. We identified some weak support for hypothesis one in 
that, having controlled for variations across models in sampling, Liberal Market Economies 
have a higher proportion of women on their boards than do Coordinated Market Economies 
by around two percentage points. However, our evidence in respect of hypothesis three was 
contrary to our expectations. Specifically, we found that countries in the Germanic and 
French clusters as classified by La Porta et al. (1998) had a lower proportion of women on 
their boards in spite of greater legislative safeguards designed to assure women’s 
employment rights and professional career opportunities. One possible explanation may lie in 
the competing contentions presented in hypothesis one and hypothesis three; although 
legislation may be designed to protect women’s employment rights, it is possible that the 
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effectiveness of employment protection law may also rely on putting in place appropriate 
incentives for companies to engage female employees. If firms operating in CMEs and civil-
law countries are not adequately compensated for the loss of human capital investment and 
skills associated with women taking career breaks, the firms will be more inclined to hire and 
invest in male employees who are more likely to have a sustained and uninterrupted career 
trajectory in the knowledge that the law would force them to invest in similar ways for male 
and female employees.  A substantive finding from this analysis, irrespective of the particular 
contention of the hypothesis posed is the finding that legal/regulatory institutional systems 
add considerable explanatory power to our model. Whilst our starting premise rested on the 
assumption that legislation designed to safeguard women’s employment opportunities and 
rights would increase the share of women board directors, in fact what may be the case is that 
women prevail to a larger degree on corporate boards in countries where the legal 
institutional system is based on market forces. In fact, it has been suggested that the 
regulative incentives provided for by strong equal opportunities legislation might require 
affirmative action initiatives such as that introduced in Norway. Although the introduction of 
a mandate that all corporate boards have a minimum of 40% of the seats occupied by women 
was highly controversial, it was successful in increasing the prevalence of women on 
corporate boards dramatically.  
Country culture was found to play an important role in shaping WOCBs, with 
countries classified as belonging either to the Scandinavian or Eastern European cultural 
cluster having more corporate board seats occupied by women than the countries classified in 
the Latin European, Confucian Asia or South Asia cluster. National culture is therefore an 
important factor in shaping corporate board demography. The GLOBE framework 
highlighted the cultural advantages afforded women in, amongst others, Scandinavian 
countries. This finding perhaps further serves to underline the importance of national 
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legislation in changing the gender composition of corporate boards. Since national cultures 
are slow to change, consequently nations with a cultural heritage might have to consider more 
radical options like affirmative action to redress the gender imbalance in the corporate board 
room. Spain, a Latin European country, with low female board participation has done just so 
(Toomey, 2008), and introduced a clause in their national corporate governance code which 
stipulates a “balanced presence of women and men” by 2015 (De Anca, 2007).  
Regarding the implications of our research for research in comparative capitalisms, 
our findings suggest that this strand of research has the capacity to contribute significantly to 
our understanding of gender-related phenomena and also to issues concerned with board 
composition. As in the case of the economic performance of nations, our findings suggest that 
no one form of capitalism is most conducive to a greater presence of WOCB but that both 
LMEs and CMEs have a higher prevalence of women on boards than other countries. 
Equally, the findings for the NBS approach demonstrate that co-ordinated economic systems 
tend to have significantly fewer WOCBs. At the same time, the project of creating more 
nuanced and descriptively valid frameworks that reflect the particular configurations of 
institutional features present in particular groups of countries appears to contribute relatively 
little to our understanding relative to the primary distinction between LMEs and CMEs made 
in the VOC approach. 
Our analysis indicates that future research concerned with the relevance of 
institutional environments for both aspects of boards of directors in general, and the 
participation of women in boards in particular, might provide further valuable insights. Our 
analysis has confined itself to a focus on board gender diversity, but future work could extend 
this to other aspects of boards and their activities. Since, as our research shows, multiple 
levels of analysis are necessary in order to fully appreciate the drivers of female participation 
on corporate boards, future research should also attempt to assess the relative importance of 
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these multiple levels of analysis. We have identified important country-level phenomena, but 
it is also important to recognise that institutional and other effects operate at the level of the 
industry, firm and within intra-firm processes. Future research could profitably explore these 
influences.  
Finally, some limitations of this study suggest valuable future research opportunities. 
Some of these relate to the sample of countries we were able to analyse and some with the 
level of analysis. Our analysis was constrained by the availability of publicly accessible data 
concerning the make up of boards in many countries, future work could attempt to overcome 
this limitation as better data become available for more African, Middle Eastern, and Asian 
countries. This would add considerable variety to the pattern of institutional environments 
present in future work and help to establish the robustness of our findings. Work that sampled 
companies other than the largest listed companies would also provide for distinctive insights. 
Future research could also go beyond the national institutional systems encompassed in our 
study, and explore the underlying components of the broad clusters of institutions explored 
here. This would help to address Allen’s (2004) observation that one shortcoming of the 
Varieties of Capitalism approach to analysing institutional context is the assumption that firm 
behaviour is identical across institutionally different countries. Whitley (1998) also notes that 
Hall and Soskice’s (2001) framework could benefit from deeper firm level probing to better 
evaluate how the particulars of internationalisation and economic activity impact on firm 
behaviour.  
Lastly, because our analysis occurs at the country level, it is unable to evaluate the 
extent to which the role of country institutions for WOCBs might vary with some firm and/or 
industry characteristics. One particularly interesting potential avenue for future research 
concerns the difference between MNCs and their domestic counterparts. MNCs are distinct in 
that they establish a physical presence in at least one other country. Recent debates on the 
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relevance of institutional context for MNCs have taken a very interesting turn, suggesting that 
MNCs make up a meta-institutional field (Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008) which transgresses 
industry and country borders. Instead, MNCs “are becoming, it is argued, increasingly 
disconnected from national institutional systems” (Kostova et al., 2008: 998). In other words, 
the national institutional context of the MNCs’ country-of-origin would be a less significant 
factor in shaping the gender-profile of MNCs’ corporate boards. Further research into the 
international character of corporate board composition has shown that a number of women 
board directors are foreign nationals, suggesting that cross-fertilisation of the institutional 
environment may be taking place (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004). Given the complex nature of 
institutional environment and the debate on women corporate board directors, the firm level 
behaviour of companies in different institutional settings with regards to this question may 
offer interesting areas of future research. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, we examine the role played by national institutional systems in 
explaining cross-country variation in the prevalence of women on corporate boards of 
directors. We do so with reference to five frameworks of national institutional systems. We 
include two economically-oriented institutional frameworks as captured by Hall and Soskice 
(2001) varieties of capitalism and Whitley’s (1992; 1999) national business systems, we 
further include two frameworks that encompass corporate governance and legislative 
institutional systems as reflected in Weimer and Pape (1999) and La Porta et al.’s (1998) 
frameworks respectively and finally one framework which centres on institutional systems 
related to national cultural characteristics (Gupta et al., 2002). Our findings show that as 
much as half of the variation across countries in the presence of women on corporate boards 
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is attributable to institutional factors and that legal institutions appear to play the most 
significant role in shaping board diversity. 
Our study has some notable practical implications. We found that legislative heritage 
was a particularly important driver in shaping corporate board demography. However, at the 
same time where countries had introduced welfare provisions to encourage women to balance 
a professional career with care responsibilities these countries had fewer women board 
directors. This suggests that affirmative action initiatives like those adopted by Norway, and 
subsequently Spain may have an important role to play in creating more gender balanced 
boards. Although Norway's decision to introduce affirmative action in this area was 
controversial at the time, it has radically altered the face of Norway's corporate boards and set 
an example to other countries. A second, but related finding was the view that national 
culture plays an important role in female board ascension. The Scandinavian and Eastern 
European cluster of countries had the largest share of female board directors, yet Norway was 
still forced to implement drastic measures to redress the gender balance in Norwegian 
boardrooms. Where a given national culture is less open to high-profile commercial roles for 
women, legislative initiatives may be a particularly effective lever in ensuring the best talent 
is represented on the corporate board of directors, irrespective of gender. 
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TABLE 1 
: The classification of countries to institutional systems 
Table 1: Typologies of National Business Environments
Grouping Countries Grouping Countries Grouping Countries Grouping Countries Grouping Countries
United States Argentina Australia United States United Kingdom
United Kingdom Brazil Canada United Kingdom United States
Ireland Chile Hong Kong Canada Australia
Canada Denmark India Australia South Africa
Australia Mexico Ireland Germany Canada
New Zealand Poland Israel Netherlands New Zealand
Japan South Africa Kenya Switzerland Ireland
Netherlands Hong Kong Malaysia Sweden Israel
Belgium Turkey New Zealand Austria Italy
Denmark Portugal Nigeria Denmark Portugal
Sweden Italy Pakistan Norway Spain
Finland Belgium Singapore Finland France
Germany Australia South Africa France Finland
Switzerland Canada Sri Lanka Italy Sweden
Norway Cyprus Thailand Spain Denmark
Austria Netherlands United Kingdom Belgium Germany
Israel New Zealand United States Japan Japan Austria
Singapore UK Zimbabwe Switzerland
Taiwan US Argentina Netherlands
S.Korea Spain Belgium Hungary
France Bulgaria Brazil Russia
Italy China Chile Kazakhstan
Spain Egypt Columbia Albania
France Ecuador Poland
Greece Egypt Greece
Hungary France Slovenia
Malaysia Greece Georgia
Russia Indonesia Costa Rica
Czech Republic Italy Venezuela
Austria Jordan Ecuador
Finland Mexico Mexico
Germany Netherlands El Salvador
Ireland Peru Columbia
Israel Philippines Guatemala
Norway Portugal Bolivia
Switzerland Spain Brazil
Sweden Turkey Argentina
Uruguay Namibia
Venezuaela Zambia
Austria Zimbabwe
Germany Nigeria
Japan Qatar
South Korea Morocco
Switzerland Turkey
Taiwan Egypt
Denmark Kuwait
Finland India
Norway Indonesia
Sweden Philippines
Malaysia
Thailand
Iran
Taiwan
China
Hong Kong
Japan
South Korea
Singapore
State Organised 
Business Systems
Coordinated 
Industrial District
Compartmentalised 
Business Systems
Scandinavian Origin 
Countries
Anglo-Saxon 
Countries
Germanic Countries
Latin Countries
English-Origin 
Countries
French-Origin 
Countries
German-Origin 
Countries
Highly Coordinated 
Business Systems
Whitley (1991, 1999) Weimar & Pape (1999)La Porta et al., (1998)
Liberal Market 
Economies
Fragmented Business 
System
Hall and Soskice (2001)
Coordinated Market 
Economies
Gupta et al., (2002)
Anglo Cultures
Latin European 
Cultures
Nordic European 
Cultures
Collaborative 
Business Systems
Germanic European 
Cultures
Confuscian Cultures
Southern Asian 
Cultures
Arab Cultures
Latin American 
Cultures
Sub-Saharan African 
Cultures
Eastern European 
Cultures
Other countries
Japan
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TABLE 2 
Cross-country variation in the percentage of board seats held by female directors 
Country Female board directors % Country
Female board directors 
%
Argentina 6.52%* Latvia 21.00%
Australia 10.90% Lichtenstein 8.33%
Austria 6.00% Lithuania 17.00%
Belgium 5.78% Luxembourg 1.00%
Brazil 8.73%* Malaysia 4.00%
Bulgaria 21.00% Malta 4.00%
Canada 8.70% Mexico 3.35%*
Chile 1.01%* Netherlands 4.88%
China 12.50% New Zealand 7.13%
Cyprus 7.00% Norway 32.00%
Czech Republic 8.00% Poland 10.00%
Denmark 12.71% Portugal 7.00%
Egypt 1.00% Romania 13.00%
Estonia 15.00% Russia 3.13%
Finland 19.00% Singapore 0.00%
France 6.98% Slovak Republic 10.00%
Germany 6.46% Slovenia 21.00%
Greece 6.31% South Africa 11.50%
Hong Kong 5.88% Spain 4.38%
Hungary 14.00% Sweden 17.37%
Iceland 6.00% Switzerland 6.37%
India 3.86% Turkey 7.00%
Ireland 4.04% UK 8.10%
Israel 13.36% Ukraine 16.67
Italy 2.63% US 15.12%
Japan 0.00%
BoardEx provided the data for the following countries: Australia, Belgium, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lichtenstein, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and Ukraine. The following countries rely on numbers from the 
European Commission: Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey. Numbers for India, Norway, 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico come from our own self-extracted dataset. Spencer Stuart provided data for the 
following countries; Canada and South Africa. Catalyst provided numbers for the US. * Latest number is from 2005
Percentage number of female board directors 2006
Page 44 of 47
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 45 
TABLE 3 
Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients 
Mean Standard Deviation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
1. % Women on the board 7.74 5.54 -
2. Liberal Market Economy .16 .37 .52 -
3. Coordinated Market Economy .22 .42 .08 -.23 -
4. English La Porta .28 .45 -.05 .70 -.33 -
5. French La Porta .27 .44 -.37 -.27 -.09 -.38 -
6. German La Porta .09 .29 -.13 -.14 .60 -.20 -.19 -
7. Scandinavian La Porta .09 .28 .32 -.14 .58 -.19 -.19 -.10 -
8. Anglo-Saxon Weimar and Pape .11 .31 .13 .80 -.19 .57 -.21 -.11 -.11 -
9. Germanic Weimar and Pape .17 .38 .16 -.20 .86 -.29 -.15 .45 .67 -.16 -
10. Latin Weimar and Pape .09 .28 -.19 -.14 .02 -.19 .51 -.10 -.09 -.11 -.14 -
11. Japanese Weimar and Pape .03 .16 -.15 -.07 .31 -.10 -.10 .52 -.05 -.06 -.08 -.05 -
12. Collaborative .17 .38 .15 -.05 .58 -.03 -.28 .45 .47 -.16 .70 -.14 -.08 -
13. Compartmentalized .20 .40 .00 .74 -.13 .48 -.05 -.16 -.15 .71 -.08 .04 -.08 -.22 -
14. Co-ordinated Industrial District .04 .20 -.16 -.09 .14 -.13 .35 -.07 -.07 -.07 -.10 .69 -.04 -.10 -.10 -
15. Fragmented .22 .41 -.16 -.23 -.16 -.08 .40 -.17 .02 -.19 -.10 -.16 -.09 -.24 -.26 -.11 -
16. State Organized .15 .36 -.01 -.18 -.22 -.16 .07 -.13 -.13 -.15 -.19 .09 -.07 -.19 -.21 -.09 -.22 -
17. Highly Coordinated .03 .16 -.15 -.07 .31 -.10 -.10 .52 -.05 -.06 -.08 -.05 1.00 -.08 -.08 -.04 -.09 -.07 -
18. Anglo Cultures (GLOBE) .16 .37 .05 1.000 -.23 .70 -.27 -.14 -.14 .80 -.20 -.14 -.07 -.05 .74 -.09 -.23 -.18 -.07 -
19. Latin Europe (GLOBE) .11 .31 -.15 -.15 -.19 -.06 .40 -.11 -.11 -.12 -.16 .64 -.06 .03 .00 .27 -.02 .05 -.06 -.15 -
20. Nordic Europe (GLOBE) .06 .25 .25 -.12 .50 -.16 -.16 -.08 .86 -.09 .58 -.08 -.04 .34 -.13 -.06 .07 -.11 -.04 -.12 -.09 -
21. German Europe (GLOBE) .09 .28 -.11 -.14 .58 -.19 -.01 .70 -.09 -.11 .67 -.09 -.05 .47 .04 -.07 -.16 -.13 -.05 -.14 -.11 -.08 -
22. Eastern Europe (GLOBE) .09 .29 .09 -.14 -.17 -.20 -.02 -.10 -.10 -.11 -.15 -.10 -.05 -.15 -.16 -.07 .01 .42 -.05 -.14 -.11 -.08 -.10 -
23. Latin American (GLOBE) .06 .25 -.16 -.12 -.14 -.16 .44 -.08 -.08 -.09 -.12 -.08 -.04 -.12 -.13 -.06 .50 -.11 -.04 -.12 -.09 -.07 -.08 -.08 -
24. South Asia (GLOBE) .03 .18 -.15 -.08 -.10 .29 -.11 -.06 -.06 -.06 -.08 -.06 -.03 -.08 -.09 -.04 -.10 .18 -.03 -.08 -.06 -.05 -.06 -.06 -.05 -
25. Confuscian Asia (GLOBE) .09 .28 -.21 -.14 .07 .11 -.19 .24 -.09 -.11 -.14 -.09 .54 -.14 -.15 -.07 .00 .09 .54 -.14 -.11 -.08 -.09 -.10 -.08 -.06 -
26. Arab (GLOBE) .01 .09 -.03 -.04 -.05 -.06 .15 -.03 -.03 -.03 -.04 -.03 -.02 -.04 -.04 -.02 -.05 .22 -.02 -.04 -.03 -.02 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.02 -.03 -
27. Sub-Sarahan Africa (GLOBE) .03 .16 .05 -.07 -.09 .27 -.10 -.05 -.05 -.06 -.08 -.05 -.03 -.08 -.08 -.04 .32 -.07 -.03 -.07 -.06 -.04 -.05 -.05 -.04 -.03 -.05 -.02
N = 257
Correlation > |.11| are significant at p = .05
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Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
Independent variables
CONSTANT 5.28 2.62 3.19 7.02 5.75 3.50
(0.86) (1.26) (0.88) (1.10) (0.82) (0.89)
2001 0.49 0.50 0.58 0.74 0.22 -0.07
(1.42) (1.51) (0.92) (1.53) (1.22) (1.02)
2002 1.37 1.86 1.34 1.25 1.13 1.39
(1.38) (1.48) (0.89) (1.49) (1.21) (1.00)
2003 3.51 2.43 1.74 2.05 1.87 2.29
(1.21)** (1.44) (0.86)* (1.44) (1.13) (0.94)*
2004 3.25 2.51 2.10 2.78 2.45 2.32
(1.17)** (1.39) (0.84)* (1.41) (1.08)* (0.91)*
2005 4.11 3.82 3.07 3.83 3.48 3.01
(1.18)** (1.46)** (0.86)** (1.44)** (1.11)** (0.95)**
2006 5.13 4.62 3.85 4.54 4.23 3.44
(1.19)** (1.41)** (0.087)** (1.44)** (1.12)** (0.95)**
2007 5.88 6.00 5.02 6.14 4.72 4.65
(1.27)** (1.54)** (0.95)** (1.57)** (1.21)** (0.99)**
Liberal Market Economy 3.58
(1.10)**
Coordinated Market Economy 3.64
(1.05)**
Other Economies
English Origin Law La Porta et al. 3.23
(0.80)**
French Origin Law La Porta et al. -0.49
(0.79)
Germanic Origin Law La Porta et al
Scandinavian Origin Law La Porta et al 8.36
(0.93)**
Germanic Law  Weimar and Pape
Latin Law Weimar and Pape -5.21
(0.96)**
Anglo-Saxon Law Weimar and Pape 0.82
(0.93)
Japanese Law Weimar and Pape -7.96
(3.14)*
Fragmented -1.09
(0.82)
Coordinated Industrial District -4.25
(1.24)**
Compartmentalized
State Organised 1.28
(0.99)
Collaborative 1.49
(0.81)
Highly coordinated -6.52
(3.12)*
Anglo Globe 3.18
(0.79)**
Latin Europe Globe -0.48
(0.86)
Germanic Europe Globe
Nordic Europe Globe 7.59
(0.96)**
Eastern Europe Globe 4.99
(0.97)**
Latin America Globe 0.09
(1.08)
South Asia Globe -2.13
(1.50)
Confucian Asia Globe -4.21
(2.47)
Sub-Saharan Globe 3.78
(1.34)**
R-Squared 13.1% 21.1% 54.4% 38.0% 25.7% 51.7%
R-Squared Adjusted 10.7% 15.9% 51.9% 32.5% 21.2% 47.4%
△in R-Squared relative to model (1) 8.0% 41.3% 24.9% 12.6% 38.6%
No. of Observations 257 144 194 124 210 185
Notes: t-values are provided in parenthesis, significance levels: †p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<.001. Variable definitions: Liberal Market 
Economy, Coordinated Market Economy and Other use dummy variables 1 or 0 to indicate which category Hall and Soskice (2001) assigned to each 
country. English origin law, French origin law, Germanic origin law and Scandinavian origin law apply a dummy variable of 1 or 0 to indicate 
country classification as applied by La Porta et al. (1999). Latin law, Anglo-Saxon law, Germanic law and Japanese law use the same dummy 
variable for ascribing categories as defined by Weimar and Pape (1999). Reflecting Whitley (1999) Fragmented, Coordinated Industrial District, 
Compartmentalised, State Organised, Collaborative and Highly coordinated business systems were applied to the country set by the authors of this 
article based on research as outlined in the methods section. Dummy variables of 1 and 0 were used.
Dependent Variable = Percentage women on corporate boards
 
TABLE 4 
Regression results (Dependent variable: Percentage women on the corporate board 
of directors) 
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Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) Model (11)
Independent variables
CONSTANT 1.80 3.22 6.82 7.02 3.65
(1.17) (0.85) (1.02) (0.98) (0.80)
2001 0.73 0.57 0.28 -0.52 0.32
(1.47) (1.05) (1.44) (1.55) (1.03)
2002 1.20 1.04 0.77 0.14 0.79
(1.43) (1.02) (1.40) (1.50) (1.00)
2003 1.97 1.70 1.51 0.81 1.45
(1.37) -(0.98) (1.34) (1.44) (0.96)
2004 2.14 2.08 2.16 1.49 2.10
(1.35) (0.96)* (1.31) (1.41) (0.94)*
2005 3.41 3.14 2.95 2.25 2.89
(1.37)* (0.98)** (1.34)* (1.44) (0.93)**
2006 3.47 3.20 3.01 2.31 2.95
(1.37)* (0.98)** (1.34)* (1.44) (0.96)**
2007 6.50 5.95 6.04 5.21 5.71
(1.44)** (1.03)** (1.45)** (1.51)** (1.01)**
Liberal Market Economy 6.26
(1.03)**
Coordinated Market Economy 4.40
(0.96)**
Other Economies
English Origin Law La Porta et al. 5.02
(0.75)**
French Origin Law La Porta et al. -0.92
(0.76)
Germanic Origin Law La Porta et al
Scandinavian Origin Law La Porta et al 7.79
(0.84)**
Germanic Law  Weimar and Pape
Latin Law Weimar and Pape -4.68
(0.93)**
Anglo-Saxon Law Weimar and Pape 1.52
(0.84)
Japanese Law Weimar and Pape -7.45
(2.76)**
Fragmented 2.08
(1.54)
Coordinated Industrial District -5.98
(1.54)**
Compartmentalized
State Organised -1.69
(1.54)
Collaborative 0.91
(0.91)
Highly coordinated -7.32
(2.97)*
Anglo Globe 4.73
(0.69)**
Latin Europe Globe -1.45
(0.75)
Germanic Europe Globe
Nordic Europe Globe 7.55
(0.78)**
Eastern Europe Globe
Latin America Globe
South Asia Globe
Confucian Asia Globe -4.25
(2.01)*
Sub-Saharan Globe 
R-Squared 37.5% 68.5% 41.7% 33.3% 70.2%
R-Squared Adjusted 31.9% 65.4% 35.9% 25.1% 66.9%
△in R-Squared relative to model (1) 31.1% 4.2% -4.2% 32.8%
No. of Observations 110 110 110 110 110
Dependent Variable = Percentage women on corporate boards
Notes: t-values are provided in parenthesis, significance levels: †p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<.001.Variable definitions: Liberal Market 
Economy, Coordinated Market Economy and Other use dummy variables 1 or 0 to indicate which category Hall and Soskice (2001) assigned to 
each country. English origin law, French origin law, Germanic origin law and Scandinavian origin law apply a dummy variable of 1 or 0 to 
indicate country classification as applied by La Porta et al. (1999). Latin law, Anglo-Saxon law, Germanic law and Japanese law use the same 
dummy variable for ascribing categories as defined by Weimar and Pape (1999). Reflecting Whitley (1999) Fragmented, Coordinated Industrial 
District, Compartmentalised, State Organised, Collaborative and Highly coordinated business systems were applied to the country set by the 
authors of this article based on research as outlined in the methods section. Dummy variables of 1 and 0 were used
 
TABLE 5 
Regression results (Dependent variable: Percentage women on the corporate board 
of directors) 
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